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Abstract
This paper considers eects of body mass on wages in the
years following labor market entry. The preferred models allow
current wages to be aected by both past and current body mass,
as well as past wages, while also addressing the endogeneity of
body mass. I nd that a history of severe obesity has a large
negative eect on the wages of white men. White women face
a penalty for a history of being overweight, with some evidence
of additional penalties that begin above the threshold for severe
obesity. Furthermore, the eects of past wages on current wages
imply that past body mass has additional, indirect eects on
wages, especially for white women.
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This paper considers eects of past and current body mass on wages in the
early years of workers' careers. Using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1997, I estimate dynamic models of wages in which body
mass is allowed to be endogenous. This approach allows workers' history in
the labor market, including past wages, to aect current wages. As a result,
eects of high body mass can accumulate and persist over time. Furthermore,
the preferred estimates are unbiased even when body mass is correlated with
both individual xed eects and time-varying unobservables.
The literature on body mass and wages has been understandably con-
cerned with the endogeneity of body mass. Cawley (2004) carefully describes
the reasons weight or body mass may be correlated with xed and time-
varying unobserved heterogeneity; however, most previous work has focused
on either individual xed eects or time-varying sources of endogeneity, but
not both in the same regression.1
One contribution of this paper is that the estimation addresses multiple
sources of bias simultaneously. The use of autoregressive wage equations
eliminates a source of omitted variable bias that has been ignored by previous
work, and individual xed eects are removed by rst-dierencing. The panel
data are then exploited to address endogeneity associated with remaining,
1E.g., Han et al. (2011) use xed eects. Baum and Ford (2004) use rst dierences.
Kline and Tobias (2008) use parent's BMI as an instrument. Cawley (2004) and Sabia
and Rees (2012) use xed eects and IV in separate regressions.
Two exceptions, Averett and Korenmann (1996) and Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001),
use dierencing to remove sibling (or twin) xed eects and then use lagged BMI as either
a proxy or an instrument for current BMI.
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time-varying errors. Furthermore, I submit my identifying assumptions to
considerable scrutiny, and nd that they survive a variety of tests.
Another important contribution of this paper is the estimation of models
that are consistent with discrimination aecting labor market search, occu-
pational sorting or other channels that imply dynamic eects of body mass
on wages. The preferred specications allow both current and past body
mass to aect wages. Furthermore, wages are aected not only by the lags of
body mass included in the model, but also by further lags that have indirect
eects through their eects on lagged wages.
In contrast, previous work has assumed that wage penalties associated
with obesity are the same whether the worker recently became obese or had
been obese her entire career. The only exception is a recent paper by Chen
(2012), which examines the eects of current BMI and BMI 10 years earlier
on the wages of workers in their 30s. The current paper provides a detailed
look inside of those early years using a more recent cohort of workers.2
This paper is also the rst in the literature to use the NLSY97, and one
of the rst to focus on workers who entered the labor market more recently
than the 1980s.3 Odgen et al. (2010) report that obesity doubled among
adults in the U.S. between 1980 and 2000. If prejudice or stereotypes evolve
2Another dierence between Chen (2012) and the current paper is the treatment of
endogeneity. Chen (2012) notes that adding future body mass to her wage regressions
suggests a problem with endogeneity, but she does not otherwise address the problem.
3Sabia and Rees (2012) replicate Cawley (2004) using a sample from Add Health that
was between 24 and 32 in 2008; however, the design of Add Health limits their ability to
perform the FE or IV estimation of Cawley (2004).
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as the population becomes heavier, results from previous work based on the
NLSY79 may not generalize to more recent cohorts.4
Finally, the estimation sample is unique in its focus on young workers in
the rst several years after entry into the labor market. As a result, the esti-
mation should be better able to capture potential discrimination as it unfolds
than it would with a sample of older workers. Wage growth is higher earlier in
careers, and changes in jobs and occupations are more important.5 Removing
xed eects in a sample of older workers is likely to remove the accumulated
eects of past discrimination suggested by Chen (2012). Furthermore, sig-
nals inferred from body mass should have larger eects for younger than for
older workers because the market knows less about younger workers.6
The empirical results suggest that wages are aected by past body mass
and past wages. White men are penalized for a history of severe obesity.
White women face a penalty for being overweight at all in previous years,
with some specications suggesting additional penalties as past or current
BMI exceeds the threshold for severe obesity. Furthermore, I nd that in-
cluding past wages in the model is critical for identication and has important
4Additionally, Altonji et al. (2012) nd that the mix of skills and family backgrounds
changed between NLSY cohorts, which would aect the ability to generalize across decades.
5See Murphy and Welch (1992), Topel and Ward (1992), and Neal (1999) among others.
6Hamermesh (2011) provides a similar argument to explain why eects of beauty on
wages might decline with age. See Altonji and Pierret (2001) for more on statistical
discrimination in the presence of employer learning. Lange (2007) discusses how quickly
the market learns about young workers.
Employer learning about healthcare costs may be more complicated than learning about
productive characteristics if the relationship between BMI and expected healthcare costs
changes with age.
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implications for the interpretation of results, especially for women.
The next section discusses models of wages and body mass, building up
to dynamic panel data specications. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3
describes tests of the identifying assumptions introduced in Section 1 before
discussing other details of the estimation. Section 4 presents results, followed
by various robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
1 Empirical Models of Body Mass and Wages
Following the recent literature, our rst attempt at specifying a wage regres-
sion to measure eects of body mass might take the form
wit = Xit +BMIit+ it; (1)
where wit is the log of person i's wage in period t; Xit is a vector of observable
characteristics, and BMIit is a vector that describes body mass using dummy
variables or a polynomial. BMIit is potentially correlated with both xed
individual eects related to genetics or upbringing and time-varying factors
in the error term, it, leading to possible endogeneity.
Some previous work used xed eects or rst-dierenced estimation to
eliminate bias in equation (1), but potential correlation between BMIit and
time-varying shocks to wages then remains.7 Other estimates used instru-
mental variables to address the bias in equation (1); however, the instruments
7E.g., Cawley (2004), Baum and Ford (2004), and Han et al. (2009).
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used so far in the literature are correlated with individual xed eects, and
likely correlated with relevant time-invariant unobservables.8 The two ap-
proaches could be combined, but doing so requires a valid instrument for
changes in BMIit.
An additional problem in the literature on weight and wages is that most
authors have, at least implicitly, assumed that only current body mass aects
wages.9 This assumption is inconsistent with the broader discrimination lit-
erature in which dynamic models are now common. For example, Lang et al.
(2005) show that hiring decisions in a wage posting model magnify eects of
prejudice or expected productivity dierences, resulting in wage dierences
even if employers are not willing to pay more to hire their preferred group.10
Bjerk (2008) shows that any one of a few types of statistical discrimination
can result in wage dierentials over time due to eects on hiring and promo-
tions.11 Adapting either of these models to discrimination based on weight
would imply that a worker's history of body mass could aect her current
wages through eects on past job search and promotions. Furthermore, any
8The most common instrument in the previous literature is the BMI of a family member,
which was rst used by Cawley (2004); however, Han et al. (2009) and my own estimation
suggest that sibling or parent's BMI predicts only time-invariant components of BMI.
More importantly, I nd that siblings' BMI is correlated with AFQT scores in the
NLSY79 and the NLSY97, even after controlling for respondents' BMI. This is consistent
with the warning in Cawley et al. (2011) that instruments based on genes may not be
valid because even a single gene can aect multiple relevant outcomes.
9As noted above, Chen (2012) is a recent, important exception.
10Dierences in healthcare costs should have similar eects to productivity dierences
in Lang et al. (2005), which would t the results of Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009).
11Additionally, Oettinger (1996) shows that dierences in uncertainty about workers'
productivity can aect workers' returns to mobility.
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statistical discrimination story in which body mass is used as a signal of
productivity or healthcare costs would imply eects of the entire history of
body mass observed by the current employer.
Regardless of how or why wage penalties arise, the idea that the full eects
of changes in body mass would be captured by immediate changes in the
wage is inconsistent with the presence of labor-market frictions. Employers
that have diculty lowering wages during economic downturns may have
diculty cutting wages in response to undesirable weight gain. Workers who
face limited opportunities due to their weight may face diculty moving to
better jobs after losing weight, much as workers who enter the labor market
during recessions face lower wages long after the economy recovers.12
If a history of being overweight or obese can aect current wages, regres-
sions like equation (1) should be modied to allow eects of both current
and past body mass. But body mass (past or current) may be aected by
past wages, which are likely correlated with current wages. In addition to the
potential simultaneity of wages and body mass that has been discussed in
the literature, it is possible that BMI is predetermined by past wages. There-
fore, lagged wages should be added to avoid omitted variable bias. Including
lagged wages has the additional benet of allowing lags of body mass that
are not included in the regression to have indirect eects on current wages
through their eects on past wages.
12See Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012). Plant closings and layos have also
been found to have persistent negative eects on wages. See, e.g., Jacobson et al. (1993).
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Using a single lag of both wage and body mass results in an autoregressive
wage equation:
wit = wit 1 +Xit +BMIit+BMIit 11 + i + "it: (2)
Both BMIit and BMIit 1 are potentially correlated with the individual xed
eect, i, as is wit 1.13 As before, BMIit may be correlated with the time-
varying error, "it; or with earlier shocks to the wage.
Dynamic panel data models like equation (2) can be estimated using
the dierenced GMM estimator developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and
Arellano and Bond (1991) (HENR and AB in what follows).14 The rst step
in this approach is to use dierences to eliminate the xed eect:
wit = wit 1 +Xit +BMIit+BMIit 11 +"it: (3)
After dierencing, BMIit and BMIit 1 may still be correlated with the
error term, and wit 1 is correlated with "it through "it 1.
Fortunately, further lagged levels of the wage are valid instruments for
wit 1 if there is no serial correlation in ". Under this assumption, wit 2
is not correlated with "it or "it 1, but is correlated with wit 1.15 The
GMM estimator of HENR and AB also uses further lags, where available, as
13Further lags of BMI or w can be included, but one lag is sucient to explain the
model. The lag structure is discussed further in Section 3.
14See Arellano and Honore (2001), Bond (2002), or Arellano (2003) for reviews.
15The correlation of wit 2 and wit 1 is weak if  is close to 1; however, the results
presented below suggest this is not a problem.
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instruments to improve eciency.
It is important to note that assuming no serial correlation in the time-
varying errors, "it, is not equivalent to assuming no serial correlation in wages
or wage growth. On the contrary, the autoregressive specications of equa-
tions (2) and (3) assume that current wages are correlated with past wages,
and current wage growth is correlated with past wage growth. The assump-
tion of no serial correlation in " is violated only if there is serial correlation in
residual heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with lagged wages, BMI (lagged
and current), and any other regressors included in Xit.
16
Lagged levels of BMI are valid instruments in the dierenced estimator
under an additional assumption. Specically, BMIit 2 and further lags are
valid instruments for BMIit and BMIit 1 as long as BMIit is uncorre-
lated with "it+1 for all t. On an intuitive level, if the endogeneity of BMIit
is due to reverse causality, this assumption requires that random shocks to
future wages do not aect current body mass. If endogeneity is due to unob-
served shocks that are common to BMIit and "it, this assumption requires
that those shocks only aect wit+1 through their eects on BMIit and wit.
17
Finally, the identication of equation (3) requires changes in BMI to be
16In contrast, serial correlation in the residuals of static wage regressions, which dom-
inate the previous literature, is expected because those residuals are not independent of
lagged wages. The dynamic estimation in the current paper, therefore, supports the com-
ments in Cawley (2004) about serial correlation in the previous literature.
17Shocks to BMIit that are correlated with both "it and "it+1 would imply serial cor-
relation in ", which is testable. It is possible that some shocks to BMIit are uncorrelated
with "it but correlated with "it+1, but this is also testable in many cases. Section 3.1
discusses tests of identifying assumptions in light of such possibilities. Section 4 presents
results of these tests, as well as additional falsication tests.
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predicted by its lagged levels. BMIit 2 should be correlated with BMIit
if BMIit is endogenous.
18 This assumption nds empirical support in the
dynamic models of body mass estimated by Goldman et al. (2010) and Ng et
al. (2010). Studies in the epidemiology literature also nd that large changes
in weight are more common among those who were initially heavier.19 Lee et
al. (2010) suggest that avoiding weight gain may require greater eort from
overweight women than from normal weight peers. Finally, in supplemental
regressions (available upon request) I nd that BMIit 2 is correlated with
BMIit, with F statistics above traditional cutos for weak instruments.
20
2 Data
This paper uses data from the 1997 through 2009 waves of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). Individuals in the sample
were between 12 and 16 years of age in 1996. They were between 24 and
30 when interviewed in 2009. The data also contain detailed information on
labor market history, demographics, and other common control variables.
The NLSY97 has important advantages over the 1979 cohort for the pur-
poses of this paper. The '97 respondents were young enough at their rst
interview that nearly all of them are observed as they begin their careers.
18If BMIit were merely predetermined, meaning it was correlated with "it 1 but not
"it, BMIit 1 would also be a valid instrument for BMIit:
19E.g., see Lewis et al. (2000) and Williamson et al. (1990).
20These regressions are not equivalent to the rst stage of 2SLS. They are suggestive. I
still consider the possibility that the instruments are too weak to identify coecients on
both BMIit and BMIit 1 when I examine the robustness of my results.
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They were also asked about height and weight in every year of the survey.
In contrast, NLSY79 respondents were as old as 22 when rst interviewed;
and they were not asked about weight in '79, '80, 83, '84 or '87. As a re-
sult, NLSY79 respondents were between 25 and 33 years old in the rst year
(1990) that BMI could be observed for three years in a row.
In what follows, attention is limited to white men and women due to
concern for sample sizes. Over twice as many respondents identify as white
than as black, which is the second largest racial or ethnic group. Furthermore,
requiring at least three consecutive years of valid wage observations reduces
the number of observations more for minorities and women than for white
men.
Additionally, only jobs following full-time labor market entry are included
in the estimation sample. Entry is dened as the rst two consecutive years
in which the individual works full time and is employed for at least 75% of
the year. This restriction is intended to exclude the temporary or part-time
jobs of younger workers that likely bear little resemblance to their eventual
adult careers.21 Part-time jobs that take place later in workers' careers are
still included in the sample.
The sample also excludes respondents who were in the military, as well
21Nearly 75% of jobs excluded by the entry restriction are part-time, compared to 9%
of jobs in the sample. Median tenure is 23 weeks for excluded jobs, but 85 weeks for jobs
following full-time entry.
The sample includes people who entered the labor-market but returned to (or never
left) school. The results discussed below are robust to excluding people who are in school,
but some statistical signicance is lost due to the smaller sample size.
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as observations for women who were pregnant at any point since the last
interview. Limiting attention to observations that can be use as time t, t 1,
or t   2 in equation (3) leaves 9,037 observations for 1,473 white men and
5,408 observations for 1,060 white women.
A more detailed discussion of the sample's selection is left to an appendix.
The rest of this section discusses information on body mass in the data,
followed by a brief description of the estimation sample.
2.1 Body Mass and Measurement Error
The data include self-reported height and weight in each year, which allows
the construction of BMI.22 The measurement error introduced by the use
of self-reported height and weight is well known and widely discussed; how-
ever, previous research has ignored the fact that roughly 10% of person/year
observations in either NLSY cohort come from telephone interviews, which
worsen misreporting relative to in-person interviews.23 All regressions that
include current or lagged BMI variables also include corresponding dummy
variables for interviews being conducted by phone.
I do not rescale self-reported height and weight based on the relationships
between reported and actual measures in NHANES data, as Cawley (2004)
and others do, for a few reasons. First of all, the assumptions required to treat
22BMI is dened as (weight in kg)=(height in m)2
23White women are especially sensitive to interview method. Controlling for age and
individual xed eects, average reported weight falls by over 3.5 pounds when white women
are interviewed by phone. Reported weight falls by over seven pounds when overweight
women are interviewed by phone.
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NHANES samples as validation data for NLSY cohorts are not credible given
the mix of interview methods in the NLSY.24 Secondly, wage penalties are
more likely driven by whether the worker's appearance conforms to desired
standards than by an actual BMI number, which is unlikely to be observed by
employers. Even measured BMI, therefore, should not be seen as the \true"
variable of interest in studies of labor market outcomes.25 Finally, rescaling
BMI to adjust for systematic misreporting may change the BMI numbers
at which we observe wage penalties, but it should not aect our ability to
determine whether heavier workers are penalized at some point.
2.2 The Estimation Sample
Table 1 presents basic summary statistics for the white men and women in
the sample. The appendix tables present additional summary statistics. The
dependent variable in regressions that follow is the natural log of hourly wage.
Average log wage is around 2.3 for men and 2.2 for women, which translate
to hourly wages of roughly 10 and 8.8.
The average respondent in the sample is roughly 24 years old.26 In 2009,
24The critical assumption is that the distribution of actual measures conditional on
reported is the same in both samples. Dierences between interview modes suggest this
assumption is violated even within NLSY cohorts. Furthermore, Han et al. (2009) suggest
that NHANES respondents expect to be weighed, but NLSY respondents do not. See
Courtemanche et al. (2015) for a more detailed discussion.
25Johansson et al. (2009) make a related point in their study of the eects of BMI,
waist circumference and body fat on labor market outcomes in Finland. Rooth (2009)
is noteworthy for his use of digitally manipulated photographs to estimate the eects of
appearing more or less fat.
26Respondents were as young as 16 in period t   2, or 18 in t. This introduces the
possibility that changes in BMI mostly reect changes in height for part of my sample
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the average respondent (male or female) was 27 years old. Average years in
the labor market is 4.5 for white men and four for women. The average male
respondent in 2009 had been in the labor market for seven years, accumu-
lating 6.4 years of actual work experience. The average woman in 2009 had
been in the labor market for 6.2 years, accumulating 5.6 years of experience.
Average reported BMI for both genders exceeds 25, which is the threshold
for being overweight. Less than 2% of white men and 4.2% of white women
report being underweight (BMI  18:5). Over 57% of white men and nearly
42% of white women are overweight (BMI  25). 22% of white men and 20%
of white women are obese (BMI  30). Almost 8% of men and over 10% of
women report a BMI that qualies as severely obese (BMI  35).
As seen in the appendix tables, movement between ocial BMI categories
is not uncommon.27 For either gender, moving to a heavier BMI category
is more likely than moving to a lighter category. Additionally, the changes
in BMI associated with changes in BMI categories (not shown) tend to be
relatively large.28 Therefore, it does not appear as though identication is
comes from small uctuations in weight that employers would not notice.
and changes in weight for the rest; however, the results presented below are robust to
excluding respondents under the age of 20.
27Roughly 9% of men and 8% of women move from one category to another between
two consecutive years. If we consider three consecutive years, roughly 15% of men and
13% of women in our estimation sample have moved between categories at least once (not
shown).
28The median percent change in BMI associated with a change in BMI category is 8.5
percent for men, and 9.5 percent for women. Median changes in BMI are three to four
times larger when categories change than they are otherwise.
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3 Estimation
Recall that the dierenced equation we're interested in takes the form
wit = wit 1 +Xit +BMIit+BMIit 11 +"it: (3)
As mentioned in the rst section, the GMM approach developed by HENR
and AB uses second and further lagged levels as instruments for wit 1 and
other endogenous variables. The GMM instruments enter as separate vectors
for each year.29 If a lag is missing, it enters as a zero. This allows the use of
further lags without limiting observations to cases that have those lags.
Letting Z denote the matrix of all instruments and b the vector of esti-
mated residuals, the moment conditions are E [Z 0b] = 0. These moments are
estimated in Stata using XTABOND2.30 All estimates use two-step ecient
GMM, which produces robust standard errors, and apply the Windmeijer
(2005) nite-sample variance correction.
3.1 Testing Assumptions
In Section 1, I assumed that the time-varying errors, "it, are not serially
correlated. AB developed tests for this assumption. First-dierenced regres-
sions like equation (3) are AR(1) by design. If there is serial correlation in
29At t = 3, wi1 is an instrument for wi2. At t = 4, wi2 and wi1 are instruments for
wi3, and so on.
30See Roodman (2006) for documentation. Stata contains other dynamic panel-data
programs, but they do not provide the same array of tests as XTABOND2.
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", equation (3) will be at least AR(2). I present tests for serial correlation
with all of the results that follow.31
The results are also presented with tests of overidentifying restrictions.
The Hansen J test examines the joint validity of all moment conditions.
When BMI is treated as endogenous, dierence-in-Hansen tests are used to
evaluate the validity of wage lags and BMI lags separately.
The validity of lagged wage levels as instruments is independently evalu-
ated by each of these tests. Lagged wage levels are valid instruments if "it are
not serially correlated. If we fail to detect serial correlation that does exist,
tests of overidentifying restrictions could still reject the validity of lagged
wage instruments as long as further lags are valid instruments.32
The validity of lagged BMI instruments are only evaluated directly by the
overidentication tests; however, tests of serial correlation make the assump-
tions of overidentication tests more plausible. If BMIit were correlated
with "it+1 but not "it+2, the second lags would not be valid instruments but
the third lags would be. Overidentication based on lagged BMI variables
would be theoretically untestable only if BMIit was correlated with "it+1,
"it+2, "it+3, etc.; however, the absence of serial correlation in " would make
this unlikely.
31I performed tests AR(3) and higher, but I only present results for AR(2). Results for
AR(3) and higher are available on request.
32The Arellano-Bond tests would have to miss a lot of serial correlation for lagged wage
instruments to be untestable using overidentication. If equation (3) were AR(2) but not
AR(3), wit 2 would not be a valid instrument for wit 1, but wit 3 would be. If the
regression were AR(3) but not AR(4), wit 4 would be a valid instrument, etc.
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For example, BMIit could be correlated with "it+1 and later residuals due
to health shocks that aect body mass more immediately than they aect
wages. But such health shocks would imply serial correlation in ", unless
the unobserved factors that were common to BMIit and "it+1 were somehow
independent of the factors common to BMIit and "it+2: Although this strikes
me as improbable, it is always possible that tests of overidentication or serial
correlation are too weak in practice to reject a hypothesis that theoretically
could be rejected.33 Therefore, I consider the possible eects of health shocks
on identication when I discuss the robustness of results in Section 4.2.
3.2 Other Potential Problems with Instruments
The use of all lagged levels of wage and BMI variables quickly produces a
large number of instruments. A larger set of instruments improves eciency,
but not without a cost. As discussed by Roodman (2009) and others, us-
ing \too many" instruments overts the endogenous variables, which biases
coecients towards OLS and weakens overidentication tests.
The results presented in the next section restrict lags to the second
through fth. Using all available lags produces coecients that are smaller
in magnitude, which is consistent with adding weak instruments. Restrict-
ing lags further (e.g., excluding the fth lag) has little eect on coecient
estimates.
33My goal here and elsewhere is to convince readers that my identifying assumptions
are reasonable and weaker than they may seem at rst glance. I acknowledge that the
identication of causal eects in this paper, as in any other, relies on assumptions.
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3.3 Regression Specications
All specications presented in this paper model BMIit as a vector of dummy
variables for various levels of body mass. The use of dummy variables is
motivated by the need for a simple specication that allows a non-linear
relationship between BMI and wages.34 Dummy variables are consistent
with the idea that wage penalties are associated with weight exceeding levels
that are considered desirable in the market. However, there is no theoretical
reason to adopt one specication of BMIit over any other.
When estimating regressions with dummy variables for BMI categories,
the previous literature relied on categories dened by the WHO (overweight,
obese, etc.); however, these categories were dened for the study of public
health, not labor markets. As noted by Gregory and Ruhm (2011), wage
penalties for high body mass may begin at points that fall between WHO
cutos. Even if employers wanted to penalize workers based on the WHO
categories, it's not clear how rms' imperfect assessments of body mass would
line up with the imperfectly reported height and weight in the data.
The next section begins with specications that use traditional BMI cat-
egories, but I also consider alternative BMI thresholds as a robustness check.
Focusing on specications of BMIit that include one or two dummy vari-
ables, I estimate a large number of alternative models with thresholds that
34In preliminary estimation, linear and polynomial specications of BMIit only pro-
duced statistically signicant results in static OLS regressions. Ignoring statistical signif-
icance, the results based on cubic polynomials are roughly consistent with the preferred
dummy-variable specications.
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range from 23 to 38.35 This allows me to compare the robustness of coef-
cient estimates for a BMI category to other changes in the specication
of BMIit. I also compare similar specications using the tests proposed by
Bond et al. (2001) and Andrews and Lu (2001), which are both based on
comparisons of the Hansen J statistic.36 Finally, I consider the robustness
of my preferred specications to the treatment of outliers in the distribution
of wages.37 In the end, I nd that specications based on traditional cutos
perform surprisingly well.
All of the dynamic models presented below include only one lag of wage
and one lag of BMI. None of the tests for serial correlation suggest that
more lags of the wage are needed, and the tests of overidentication fail to
suggest a problem with the instruments. Further lags of BMI are never
statistically signicant and do not qualitatively change the results; however,
adding further lags may simply ask too much of the data. The only noticeable
eect of adding a second lag of either BMI or the wage is a reduction of
observations by 20% for men and 25% for women.38
All regressions control for the local unemployment rate and incidence of
obesity in the state, as well as dummy variables for region, urban residence,
35I estimated models with three dummy variables, but they provided no obvious advan-
tage over those with two.
36I used leave-one-out crossvalidation, dropping all observations for each respondent one
at a time, to ensure that these test results were not peculiar to the estimation sample.
37As noted in the appendix, I only drop wages if  ln(wit) is greater than 6.5 in absolute
value. This leaves some observations with unusually high or low wages.
38An advantage of focusing on young workers is that they have less history in the market
to control for. In a sample of older workers, one lag of wages or BMI would be expected
to capture less of a worker's relevant past.
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and being interviewed by telephone.39 When lagged values of BMI variables
are included as regressors, the corresponding lag of the phone indicator is
also included. Education enters as dummy variables for completing high
school, some college, or college and beyond. I control for time using dummy
variables for calendar year and the number of years since labor market entry.
No estimation in this paper is weighted.
I also control for actual experience in the labor market and it's square
in the dynamic panel estimates. To control for commitment to the labor
market, I add interactions of experience with years since entry. Controlling
for actual experience and its interactions makes the validity of lagged wages
as instruments more plausible.40 Since actual experience may be endogenous,
potential experience (age schooling six), its square and its interactions are
used as traditional instruments in the dynamic models. In OLS regressions,
I simply replace actual experience with potential.
Finally, there are a number of potential confounders, such as occupation
or hours worked, that are excluded from the preferred models due to their
likely endogeneity. After presenting the main results, I examine the robust-
ness of those results to the addition of these and other variables. I discuss
the possibility that some of these variables may be intermediate outcomes
through which body mass aects wages, as well as possible implications for
39Local unemployment and state identiers are provided by the NLSY97 Geocode les.
Percent obese in the state is estimated by the CDC.
40Lagged wages might reect the accumulation of experience or commitment to the
labor market. Overidentication tests for lagged wage instruments improve with the use
of actual experience and its interactions.
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my identifying assumptions.
4 Results
I nd that white men face a penalty for past severe obesity, while white
women face a penalty for being overweight at all in the past year. Considering
alternative BMI thresholds, women are penalize for a past BMI over 24.5,
with additional penalties for past BMI of 37 or more. The only evidence I
nd of an eect of current BMI on wages is a penalty faced by women with
a reported BMI of at least 37. Additionally, the results support the use of
autoregressive wage equations and suggest that BMI is endogenous even after
removing individual xed eects.
The next subsection discusses the main results, and then compares the
preferred dynamic models to simpler regressions. Section 4.2 considers the
robustness of the main results to several potential sources of bias.
4.1 The Preferred Models
As discussed in section 3.3, BMIit is modeled using dummy variables for
exceeding various BMI thresholds. For white men and then white women,
I rst present specications based on the familiar categories of overweight,
obese and severely obese before I discuss alternative specications of BMIit.
I then compare the preferred dynamic models to simpler dynamic and static
models
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4.1.1 Results for White Men
Table 2 presents results for white men from various models that use dummy
variables indicating overweight, obesity or severe obesity.41 First of all, note
that the tests presented in the lower panel are all consistent with the iden-
tifying assumptions discussed above. All of the equations are AR(1) due to
rst-dierencing; but none of them are AR(2), which they would be if there
were serial correlation in the residuals.42 Furthermore, none of the tests
of overidentifying restrictions reject the validity of the GMM instruments.
The p-values for Hansen and dierence-in-Hansen tests are all well above the
conservative threshold of 0.25 suggested by Roodman (2009).
The coecient estimates in Table 2 suggest that white men face a penalty
of roughly 17% for having been severely obese in the previous year. The
coecients on lagged severe obesity range from -0.165 (0.060) in column 4
to -0.172 (0.059) in column 5. No other BMI variable has a statistically
signicant coecient in this table, and there is no evidence of current BMI
having any eect on the wages of white men.43
The results for men also support the inclusion of an autoregressive term
in the wage equations, and I nd that controlling for lagged wages is essential
41All specications in Tables 2 and 3 use lagged indicators of overweight, obesity and
severe obesity as instruments. This ensures that the instruments capture the same amount
of variation in each specication. I also use lags of three BMI dummies as instruments
when alternative BMI cutos are considered, with each alternative category replacing the
closest WHO category.
42I also found no evidence of the residuals being AR(3) or higher.
43Results for the model that specied BMIit using overweight and obese are excluded.
They are consistent with those in columns 2 and 3.
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for identication. In specications that include severe obesity, coecients on
lagged log wages are between 0.072 (0.041) and 0.077 (0.042). Specications
that exclude lagged wages but are otherwise similar to those in Table 2 (not
shown) are at least AR(2). Consistent with Cawley's (2004) point that lagged
BMI variables are not likely to be valid instruments in the presence of serial
correlation, the second lags of BMI are rejected by overidentication tests
in static wage equations.
When I consider alternative dummy variable specications of BMIit for
white men, I nd that the penalty for lagged severe obesity is remarkably
robust.44 There is no robust evidence of an eect at lower levels of current
or lagged body mass for white men.45 Furthermore, the specication test
proposed by Andrews and Lu (2001) supports models that use severe obesity
over similar models that use nearby cutos.46
I select a preferred specication from Table 2 using the test of parameter
restrictions proposed by Bond et al. (2001).47 The only restricted specica-
44The coecient on lagged severe obesity is qualitatively similar and statistically sig-
nicant in specications with lower cutos ranging from 24 to 33. Coecients on lagged
BMI34.5 are similar, but smaller and statistically signicant in fewer models.
45Coecients on BMI  29.5 are statistically signicant in a few specications, but are
not robust to the treatment of outliers. They are driven by a single observation in which
the reported wage fell from $7.11 to $0.04.
46Andrews and Lu (2001) develop a GMM analogue of the Bayesian Information Crite-
rion. When comparing models that have the same number of variables and instruments,
their approach amounts to selecting the model that minimizes the Hansen J statistic. For
example, the J statistics of models that replace severe obesity in column 5 of Table 2 with
indicators for BMI 34:5 or 35:5 rise to 135.5 and 139.3, respectively.
47Bond et al. (2001) show that dierences between the J statistics of restricted and
unrestricted specications are distributed 2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of restrictions.
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tion that cannot be rejected in favor of the full specication (column 1) is the
specication in column 5, which models BMIit using dummy variables for
being overweight and severely obese.48 The Andrews-Lu test also selects this
specication over the others that use two dummy variables to model BMIit.
Since the specication in column 5 is simpler than that in column 1, it is my
preferred specication in what follows.
4.1.2 Results for White Women
The results presented in Table 3 show that white women face a penalty for a
lagged BMI in (or above) the overweight category. The coecient on lagged
overweight status is -0.082 (0.040) in column 2, and -0.093 (0.044) in column
6. The Andrews-Lu test suggest that the specication in columns 2 and 6 are
preferred to others that model BMIit using the same number of traditional
BMI categories. The specication in column (6), which models BMIit using
dummy variables for reported overweight and severe obesity is also the same
as the preferred specication for white men.
Using alternative BMI thresholds may be more important for white women
than for white men. The penalty for a lagged BMI24.5 is robust across all
specications with a second cuto at or above 27, or without a second BMI
variable. As seen in Table 4, the estimated coecients on lagged BMI  24.5
(columns 3-5) are similar, but consistently larger than analogous coecients
48Columns 2 and 3 are rejected at any conventional level. Column 6 is rejected at a 5%
level, and column 4 at a 10% level.
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on lagged overweight status (columns 1 and 2).49
When I consider alternative thresholds in the heavier part of the BMI
distribution, I nd some evidence of an additional penalty for a BMI  37.
This corresponds to a penalty for being in the heaviest eight percent of the
distribution, as does the penalty faced by severely obese white men.50 The
results, shown in columns 2 and 5 of Table 4, suggest a penalty for a current
BMI of 37 or more of 13 to 14 percent. Furthermore, the coecient on a
lagged BMI  37 is -0.099 (0.038) in column 6.51
The Hansen J statistics in Table 4 support the use of reported overweight
status instead of the slightly lower threshold of 24.5; however, the direction of
this dierence is not robust to the treatment of outliers or to small changes in
the set of instruments used.52 In either case, the results suggest that women
who reported a BMI at of slightly below the threshold for overweight in the
previous year face a penalty of 9-12 percent. Considering the distribution of
BMI in my sample, these results suggest that over 40 percent of young white
women face some penalty for their weight.
49Coecients on lagged overweight status are statistically signicant in roughly half as
many models as coecients on lagged BMI  24.5.
507.9% of women in the sample report a BMI  37, while 7.8% of men report being
severely obese.
51The number of instruments changes when a higher threshold of 37 is used instead
of the lower cuto for severe obesity of 35, making a comparison of Hansen J statistics
between specications dicult.
Coecients for BMI cutos of 36.5 and 37.5 are similar to those for BMI  37, but are
smaller in magnitude and statistically signicant in fewer alternative models.
52Specication that use BMI 24:5 have smaller J statistics if dummy variables for lags
of obesity are not included in the set of instruments, or if lagged overweight status is used
as an instrument in both specications. In contrast, such changes in the instrument vector
have no eect on the relative performance of specications for men.
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Regardless of specication, I nd that lagged wages have larger eects
on current wages for white women than for white men. The coecients
on lagged log wages range from 0.211 (0.057) to 0.231 (0.057) for women,
compared to 0.077 (0.042) for men.53 As in Table 2, there is no evidence
of serial correlation in the residuals of any model shown in Table 3 or 4;
however, models that exclude lagged wages (not shown) are at least AR(2).
Furthermore, none of the overidentication tests cast doubt on the validity
of instruments in the autoregressive models of Tables 2 through 4.
On a more meaningful level, autoregressive wage equations imply that
workers' history of body mass aects wages beyond the single lags included
in the model. The wage in t 1 is a function of BMIit 2. It's also a function
of wit 2, which is aected by BMIit 3; and so on. This is an important
advantage of dynamic models: In contrast to previous work, the models in
this paper do not assume that the penalty for being heavy is the same as the
penalty for becoming heavy. Wages are allowed to respond slowly to changes
in BMI, implying penalties that persist and accumulate over time.
As an example, consider two women who enter the market at t  2: One
has a BMI of 38 and the other has a BMI of 23. The heavier woman loses
weight and the other gains weight so that both are overweight (but not obese)
in years t  1 and t. In t  1; the woman who had been heavier faces a 20%
penalty according to column (5) of Table 4, while the woman who had been
53Note that the weak identication problem discussed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is
only relevant when the coecients on lagged wages approach one.
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lighter faces no statistically signicant penalty for her recent weight gain.
In year t, both women have been overweight (but not obese) for two years;
however, one faces a penalty of 10% and the other faces a penalty of up to
15%.54 Even using the more conservative specication of column (1), the
woman who was heavier at t   2 would face a penalty of 11.4% in year t,
while the other woman faces a penalty of 9.3%.
The negative eects of high body mass also accumulate over time. A
woman entering the market with a BMI over 37 initially faces a penalty of
roughly 13%, according to the model in column (5). If she does not lose
weight, she will again face the 13% penalty for current body mass in her
second year, plus a 20% penalty for her past body mass. In her third year
with a BMI over 37, she will be penalized an additional 4.5% for her BMI two
years ago, on top of the 33% penalty for her BMI in t and t 1. Women with
a reported BMI at (or slightly below) the threshold for being overweight face
a penalty of 9 to 12 percent after one year that approaches 12 to 16 percent
over time.
4.1.3 Comparisons to Simpler Models
Tables 5A and 5B compare the preferred dynamic specications to OLS re-
gressions and an autoregressive model that assumes BMIit is exogenous.
The OLS results for men in Table 5A suggest that overweight men are paid
54The estimated eect of BMIit 2  37 in t is -0.044 (0.020), the eect in t 1 multiplied
by the coecient on wit 1. If the woman was also overweight in t   1, her combined
penalty in t is -0.148 (0.056).
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more than lighter peers while severely obese men are paid less.55 The OLS
results in Table 5B suggest that being overweight (upper panel) or having
a BMI24.5 (lower panel) is associated with lower wages for white women,
which is consistent with previous research; however, this negative association
is driven by lagged BMI, not current.
The autoregressions presented in the second columns of Tables 5A and
5B remove any bias that may arise from correlation with individual xed
eects or the omission of lagged wages, but treat BMIit and BMIit 1
as exogenous. Tests of overidentifying restrictions (not shown) reject this
assumption, suggesting that changes in BMI are correlated with time-varying
unobservables.56 The fact that the negative eects of body mass found in the
preferred specications are not found in the second column of either table is
consistent with time-varying unobservables, such as time spent sitting at a
desk, that are positively correlated with both wages and body mass.
Finally, note that the error terms in the static OLS regressions shown in
Tables 5A and 5B are serially correlated, while the errors in the dynamic
models are not. The serial correlation of residuals in the static models sup-
ports the argument of Cawley (2004) against the use of lagged BMI variables
as instruments in static wage equations. In contrast, the dynamic wage equa-
55When lagged BMI variables are added, the OLS coecients on current and lagged
dummies for BMI categories are jointly signicant for white men.
56I reject the exogeneity of the BMIit for white men when I use only the second and
third lags of w as instruments. (Using more instruments weakens overidentication tests.)
I reject the exogeneity of BMIit for women in models that include further lagged levels
of BMI as instruments.
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tions explicitly model the correlation between past and current wages that
creates serial correlation in the residuals of static wage regressions. As a re-
sult, we see no evidence of residual serial correlation in the dynamic models.
4.2 Robustness Tests and Potential Sources of Bias
4.2.1 Robustness to Additional Control Variables
There are a number of variables that might be correlated with both wages
and BMI that have been excluded so far. Some of these variables are poten-
tial intermediate outcomes through which body mass could inuence wages.
Examining the robustness of results to the inclusion of such variables may
shed light on potential mechanisms connecting BMI to wages. Furthermore,
as noted by Angrist and Krueger (1999) among others, sensitivity of the
results to the inclusion (or exclusion) of dierent observable characteristics
could suggest sensitivity to the exclusion of unobservable characteristics.
The results presented above are surprisingly robust to the addition of
potentially endogenous confounders, as well as other changes in the set of
control variables.57 The rst such variables I consider are marital status,
number of children, and indicators for age of the youngest child being less
than or equal to two or ve. There are a number of reasons these variables
may be correlated with wages and BMI, especially for women; however, their
addition to my preferred models has no noticeable aect on the estimated
57All of the results discussed in this subsection are available on request; however, I do
not present most of them for the sake of brevity.
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coecients.58
One might expect a high BMI to be related to hours worked, the dura-
tion of employment relationships or investment in on-the-job training; how-
ever, I nd no evidence that these are important confounders or intermediate
outcomes. I examined hours worked by adding current and lagged dummy
variables for working part time or working 60 hours or more per week. I also
added current and lagged levels of tenure, as well as indicators for the receipt
of on-the-job training.59 In each case, the estimated coecients of interest
were similar to those presented above.
I also nd no evidence of BMI aecting wages through selection into
jobs that oer health insurance. Working for an employer that oers health
insurance is associated with higher wages. A wage dierential could arise
in part from heavier workers being pushed out of jobs that oer insurance;
however, adding indicators for employer-provided insurance has little eect
on the results.60
Occupation
As shown in Table 6, indicators for occupation are the only variables I've
found that do aect the results of my preferred models. The estimated
58For discussions of BMI and marriage, see Averett et al. (2008) or Chiappori et al.
(2012). The presence and age of children would more likley be an endogenous confounder
than an intermediate outcome.
59I considered specications of training as both a dummy variable for training in the
past year, and a count of years in which training was received.
60This result does not directly contradict Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009), who suggest
that wage penalties vary with whether health insurance is oered or not. Unfortunately,
extending my estimation to investigate their story is not practical.
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eects of BMI on the wages of women decrease in magnitude when controls
for occupation are added. Only the coecient for a lagged BMI24.5 is still
statistically signicant at even a 10% level, and it falls from -0.103 (0.043)
to -0.078 (0.046). In contrast, the eect of past severe obesity on the wages
of white men rises, if anything.
The regressions presented in Table 6 use second lagged levels of occu-
pation as instruments because the exogeneity of current occupation can be
rejected for both genders. Although the second lags cannot be jointly re-
jected at conventional levels for either gender, the p-value for women are
not reassuring. Furthermore, the second lag of managerial, professional and
technical occupations can be rejected at conventional levels for women. Es-
pecially when combined with the changes in coecients on BMI variables,
these results are consistent with those in Lakdawalla and Philipson (2007),
which suggest that body mass drives selection into occupations for women.61
Health Shocks, Ability & Identication
The identifying assumptions in this paper already received an unusual
amount of empirical scrutiny in Section 4.1; however, further examination
is justied for two reasons. First, as is always the case, it is possible that
a test presented in Section 4.1 failed to reject an assumption that should
have been rejected.62 Secondly, as discussed in Section 3.1, the validity of
61Also see Han et al. (2011), and the recent structural work of Harris (2015). Like
Lakdawalla and Philipson (2007), these papers use data from the NLSY79.
62Fortunately, tests of serial correlation and overidentifying restrictions do reject hy-
potheses that we expect to be rejected, but type II errors are still possible.
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using lagged levels of BMI as instruments would be theoretically untestable
if BMIit were somehow correlated with all future wage residuals ("it+1; "it+2;
etc.) without those residuals being correlated with each other.
The most obvious reason why BMIit might be correlated with future wage
residuals is that random health shocks could aect body mass immediately,
but have delayed eects on wages that are independent of BMIit. Although
health shocks that cause BMIit to be correlated with both "it+1 and "it+2
would likely cause serial correlation in ", which I don't nd, I examine the
possibility that my main results are biased by such shocks in Table 7.
Table 7 compares the preferred models from Section 4.1 to models that
add indicators of current and lagged general health. The self-reported mea-
sure of health that is available in the data is not ideal; however, it is corre-
lated with body mass as one would expect.63 If the main results are biased
by health shocks that are correlated with changes in reported health, those
results should not be robust to the inclusion of changes in health. The results
would also not be robust to the addition of health variables if health were an
intermediate outcome through which body mass aected wages. Therefore,
the falsication test in Table 7 could suggest a problem with my identifying
assumptions even when none exists.
The preferred models for men and women are quite robust to the inclusion
of changes in general health status. Regardless of whether I add only the most
63Respondents were asked to evaluate their health on a ve-point scale from \excellent"
(1) to \poor" (5). Higher levels of BMI are negatively correlated with \excellent" or \very
good" health, and positively correlated with \fair" or \poor" health.
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recent changes or also include lagged changes in health, the coecients on
BMI are similar.64 Furthermore, none of the overidentication tests at the
bottom of each panel change in a way that suggests health shocks aect the
identication of the BMI variables, or the overall identication of the model.
Another reason BMIit may be correlated with future wage residuals is
that both may be aected by individual ability. Either human capital accu-
mulation or employer learning could result in time-invariant individual ability
having eects on wages that vary over time. If ability is also correlated with
maintaining a desirable body mass, the results in this paper could be biased,
despite the use of rst-dierences.65
I examine this possibility by adding the interaction of AFQT with time
in the labor market to the preferred models. If time-varying eects of time-
invariant ability bias my results, the results should not be robust to allow-
ing an ability measure to aect wage growth. Adding AFQT interactions,
however, have no discernible eect on the coecient estimates or the test
statistics presented in previous tables.66
64I also estimated models with up to ve lags of the health indicators, and models that
use the lagged residuals of BMI regressed on health indicators as instruments. In each
case, the results were similar to those in Table 7.
The results for BMI are insensitive to assumptions about the exogeneity of general
health, but the results for health indicators (not shown) are. \Very good" health is
associated with higher wages than \excellent" health, but only when reported health is
treated as exogenous.
65In Section 1, I questioned the validity of sibling BMI as an instrumental variable on
the grounds that it predicts AFQT, even if we control for the respondent's BMI. The
dierencing used in the current paper rules out bias from time-invariant eects of ability,
but not time-varying eects of ability.
66Results are available on request. The coecient on AFQT interacted with years in
the market is not statistically signicant in any specication.
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4.2.2 Sample Selection
There are two reasons to worry about selection into the estimation sample
biasing results in this paper: The dynamic models require three consecutive
years of labor market participation, and I've limited attention to workers who
have worked full time for at least 75% of two consecutive years. On the other
hand, the dierenced estimator is only aected by selection bias if selection
into the sample is based on time-varying unobservables. Bias from selection
on unobservables that are constant over time is removed by dierencing.
Following Semykina and Wooldridge (2010), I estimate probits for the
probability of being in the sample in year t with valid observations for t,
t  1 and t  2:67 I then add the resulting inverse Mills ratios and their inter-
actions with time dummies to the wage regressions. The null hypothesis of
no selection is rejected if coecients on the Mills ratios and their interactions
are jointly signicant.
These tests do not indicate that the main results of the paper are biased
by selection on time-varying unobservables. None of the coecients on the
inverse Mills ratios or their interactions are statistically signicant. The p-
value on the test of joint statistical signicance is 0.26 for white men and
0.29 for white women.
67AFQT is used as an instrument in the probit estimates. AFQT strongly predicts
participation, but it is dierenced out of the wage equations.
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4.2.3 Further Examination of the Strength of Instruments
Although preliminary regressions support the assumption that BMIit 2 and
other recent lags predict BMIit, one might still worry that there is not
enough variation in the lagged levels to identify coecients on both BMIit
and BMIit 1.68 In that case, the estimates in my preferred specications,
especially for BMIit, would be biased toward zero.
69
One way to address a potential lack of variation would be adding lags
of continuous BMI variables to the instrument matrix. This would exploit
variation in past BMI that is not captured by dummy variables. When I add
lags of BMI to the set of instruments, however, the results (not shown) are
similar to those presented above.70
I also compared the preferred specications to restricted specications
that include either BMIit or BMIit 1, but not both.71 If there is an
eect of BMIit that we can't observe in the main results due to insucient
variation in the instruments, we would expect a change in the coecients on
BMIit when BMIit 1 is excluded.72
68The GMM estimator of HENR exploits a larger set of moment conditions than tra-
ditional IV estimation. Regressions of BMIit on lagged levels are not analogous to the
rst stage of traditional 2SLS.
69More precisely, the coecients would be biased toward those in the second columns
of Tables 5A and 5B, which are smaller and statistically insignicant.
70I used only the second and third lags of the continuous variables to avoid a large
increase in the number of instruments.
71Kropfhauer and Sunder (2015), citing an early version of the current paper, estimate
similar wage equations that only include BMI variables from one year. They use German
data that has wage information every other year and BMI in o years. With t indexing
a single year, their model takes the form: wit = wit 2 +Xit + BMIit 1+ it; where
BMIit 1 is quadratic.
72The coecients could also change because BMIit is correlated with BMIit 1:
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The results (not shown) do not suggest that the preferred specications
are aected by weak instruments. Dropping BMIit 1 from wage equations
does not reveal eects of current BMI that were not previously identied. In
fact, the estimated penalty white women face for a current BMI37 is only
statistically signicant when lagged BMI is also included in the regression.
Furthermore, comparing Hansen J statistics between specications, as sug-
gested by Bond et al. (2001), rejects the restricted specications for both men
and women in favor of models that include both BMIit and BMIit 1.
5 Discussion
The results of this paper demonstrate the importance of using dynamic mod-
els when considering eects of body mass on wages. I nd that past body
mass aects the wages of young workers more often than current body mass.
Furthermore, current wages are aected by lagged wages, which are aected
by further lags of body mass and wages. Therefore, in contrast to previous
work, my results make it clear that the penalty for becoming heavy is not the
same as the penalty for being heavy throughout the early years of a career.
Penalties for a high body mass can persist and even accumulate over time,
especially for women.
Consistent with the youth of the sample, the penalties for high body
mass identied in this paper do not appear to be driven by changes in health
or selection into jobs with employer-provided health insurance. The main
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results are robust to the addition of controls for general health or having a
job that oers insurance coverage. Furthermore, the dierences in penalties
by gender seem more consistent with discrimination based on appearance
than with impaired health or expected healthcare costs.
The results are consistent with dynamic models of discrimination that
incorporate labor market frictions. For example, models in which discrimi-
nation aects labor market search, like those in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002)
and Lang et al. (2005), are consistent with penalties based on recent lags of
body mass. The idea that body mass can aect labor market search is also
supported by the eld experiment of Rooth (2009), who nds that obese job
applicants receive fewer interview requests.
Finally, persistent eects of high body mass on wages are consistent with
eects on occupational selection. Some of the evidence in this paper points
to occupation as an intermediate outcome through which body mass aects
wages, especially in the case of white women. The results suggest that the
occupational selection observed in the NLSY79 by Lakdawalla and Philipson
(2007) and Harris (2015) still aects the wages of young workers who entered
the labor market in more recent decades.
37
References
Altonji, J. G., P. Bharadwaj, and F. Lange (2012). Changes in the charac-
teristics of american youth: Implications for adult outcomes. Journal of
Labor Economics 30 (4), 783{828.
Altonji, J. G. and C. R. Pierret (2001). Employer learning and statistical
discrimination. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (1), 313{350.
Andrews, D. W. and B. Lu (2001). Consistent model and moment selection
procedures for gmm estimation with application to dynamic panel data
models. Journal of Econometrics 101 (1), 123{164.
Arellano, M. (2003). Panel Data Econometrics. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). Some tests of specication for panel data:
Monte carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review
of Economic Studies 58 (2), 277{297.
Arellano, M. and B. Honore (2001). Panel data models: some recent devel-
opments. Handbook of econometrics 5, 3229{3296.
Averett, S. and S. Korenmann (1996). The economic reality of the beauty
myth. The Journal of Human Resources 31, 304{330.
Baum, C. L. and W. F. Ford (2004). The wage eects of obesity: A longitu-
dinal study. Health Economics 13 (9), 885{899.
Behrman, J. and M. Rosenzweig (2001). The returns to increasing body
weight.
Bhattacharya, J. and M. K. Bundorf (2009). The incidence of the healthcare
costs of obesity. Journal of Health Economics 28 (3), 649{658.
Bjerk, D. (2008). Glass ceilings or sticky oors? statistical discrimina-
tion in a dynamic model of hiring and promotion*. The Economic Jour-
nal 118 (530), 961{982.
Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions
in dynamic panel data models. Journal of econometrics 87 (1), 115{143.
38
Bond, S. R. (2002). Dynamic panel data models: A guide to micro data
methods and practice. Portuguese Economic Journal 1 (1), 141{162.
Bond, S. R., C. Bowsher, and F. Windmeijer (2001). Criterion-based in-
ference for gmm in autoregressive panel data models. Economics Let-
ters 28 (3).
Bowlus, A. J. and Z. Eckstein (2002). Discrimination and skill dierences
in an equilibrium search model. International Economic Review 43 (4),
1309{1345.
Cawley, J. (2004). The impact of obesity on wages. Journal of Human
Resources 39 (2), 451{474.
Cawley, J., E. Han, and E. C. Norton (2011). The validity of genes related
to neurotransmitters as instrumental variables. Health Economics 20 (8),
884{888.
Chen, A. J. (2012). When does weight matter most? Journal of Health
Economics 31 (1), 285{295.
Chiappori, P.-A., S. Orece, and C. Quintana-Domeque (2012). Fatter at-
traction: anthropometric and socioeconomic matching on the marriage
market. Journal of Political Economy 120 (4), 659{695.
Courtemanche, C., J. C. Pinkston, and J. Stewart (2015). Adjusting body
mass for measurement error with invalid validation data. Economics &
Human Biology 19, 275{293.
Goldman, D., D. Lakdawalla, and Y. Zheng (2010). Food prices and the
dynamics of body weight. Working Paper 15096, NBER.
Gregory, C. A. and C. J. Ruhm (2011). Where does the wage penalty bite?
In Economic aspects of obesity, pp. 315{347. University of Chicago Press.
Hamermesh, D. S. (2011). Beauty pays: Why attractive people are more
successful. Princeton University Press.
Han, E., E. C. Norton, and L. M. Powell. (2011). Direct and indirect eects of
teenage body weight on adult wages. Economics and Human Biology 9 (4),
381{392.
39
Han, E., E. C. Norton, and S. C. Stearns (2009). Weight and wages: fat
versus lean paychecks. Health Economics 18 (5), 535{548.
Harris, M. (2015). The impact of body weight on occupational mobility and
career development.
Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Newey, and H. S. Rosen (1988). Estimating vector
autoregressions with panel data. Econometrica 56, 1371{1395.
Jacobson, L. S., R. J. LaLonde, and D. G. Sullivan (1993). Earnings losses
of displaced workers. The American Economic Review , 685{709.
Johansson, E., P. Bockerman, U. Kiiskinen, and M. Heliovaara (2009). Obe-
sity and labour market success in nland: The dierence between having
a high bmi and being fat. Economics & Human Biology 7 (1), 36{45.
Kahn, L. B. (2010). The long-term labor market consequences of graduating
from college in a bad economy. Labour Economics 17 (2), 303{316.
Kline, B. and J. L. Tobias (2008). The wages of bmi: Bayesian analysis
of a skewed treatment-response model with non-parametric endogeneity.
Journal of Applied Econometrics 23 (6), 767{793.
Kropfhauer, F. and M. Sunder (2015). A weighty issue revisited: the dy-
namic eect of body weight on earnings and satisfaction in germany. Ap-
plied Economics 47 (41), 4364{4376.
Lakdawalla, D. and T. Philipson (2007). Labor supply and body weight.
Journal of Human Resources 42, 85{116.
Lang, K., M. Manove, and W. T. Dickens (2005). Racial discrimination
in labor markets with posted wage oers. The American economic re-
view 95 (4), 1327{1340.
Lee, I.-M., L. Djousse, H. D. Sesso, L. Wang, and J. E. Buring (2010).
Physical activity and weight gain prevention. JAMA 303 (12), 1173{1179.
Lewis, C. E., D. R. Jacobs, H. McCreath, C. I. Kiefe, P. J. Schreiner, D. E.
Smith, and O. D. Williams (2000). Weight gain continues in the 1990s:
10-year trends in weight and overweight from the cardia study. American
Journal of Epidemiology 151 (12), 1172{1181.
40
Michaud, P.-C. and A. V. Soest. (2008). Health and wealth of elderly cou-
ples: Causality tests using dynamic panel data models. Journal of Health
Economics 27 (5), 1312{1325.
Neal, D. A. (1999). The complexity of job mobility among young men.
Journal of Labor Economics 17 (2), 237{61.
Ng, S. W., E. C. Norton, D. K. Guilkey, and B. M. Popkin (2010). Estimation
of a dynamic model of weight. Technical report, NBER Working Papers
15864.
Oettinger, G. S. (1996). Statistical discrimination and the early career evo-
lution of the black-white wage gap. Journal of Labor Economics 14 (1),
52{78.
Ogden, C. L. and M. D. Carroll (2010). Prevalence of overweight, obesity, and
extreme obesity among adults: United states, trends 1960{1962 through
2007{2008. National Center for Health Statistics 6, 1{6.
Oreopoulos, P., T. von Wachter, and A. Heisz (2012). The short-and long-
term career eects of graduating in a recession. American Economic Jour-
nal: Applied Economics 4 (1), 1{29.
Roodman, D. M. (2006). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to `dier-
ence' and `system' gmm in stata. working paper 103, Center for Global
Development.
Roodman, D. M. (2009). A note on the theme of too many instruments.
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 71 (1), 135{158.
Rooth, D.-O. (2009). Obesity, attractiveness, and dierential treatment in
hiring: A eld experiment. Journal of Human Resources 44 (3), 710{735.
Sabia, J. J. and D. I. Rees (2012). Body weight and wages: Evidence from
add health. Economics & Human Biology 10 (1), 14{19.
Semykina, A. and J. M. Wooldridge (2010). Estimating panel data models in
the presence of endogeneity and selection. Journal of Econometrics 157 (2),
375{380.
Topel, R. H. and M. P. Ward (1992). Job mobility and the careers of young
men. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2), 439{479.
41
Williamson, D. F., H. S. Kahn, P. L. Remington, and R. F. Anda (1990).
The 10-year incidence of overweight and major weight gain in us adults.
Archives of Internal Medicine 150 (3), 665.
Windmeijer, F. (2005). A nite sample correction for the variance of linear
ecient two-step gmm estimators. Journal of Econometrics 126 (1), 25{51.
42
A Data
This appendix describes the selection of the estimation sample, and presents
more detailed summary statistics.
The sample was rst restricted to white respondents in the NLSY97. This
drops 3,752 respondents, leaving 2,702 white men and 2,530 white women.
Respondents who reported being in the military were then dropped, leaving
34,522 person/year observations for 2,470 men, and 31,378 observations for
2,481 women.73
Restricting observations to those in which the respondent has entered the
labor market reduces the number of observations to 12,368 for 1,771 white
men, and 10,008 for 1,566 women. Only the primary (current or most recent)
job is used from each interview. Observations in which a woman reported
being pregnant in the current year (since the last interview) or previous year
were also dropped, reducing observations to 8,600 for 1,558 women. Finally,
5 observations for men and 2 for a woman were dropped because the absolute
value of the change in log wages was greater than 6.5.74
The preferred dynamic panel specications require three consecutive ob-
servations in a row with non-missing values of wage and BMI. Restricting
observations to those that could be from one of three such consecutive years
leaves 9,037 observations for 1,473 men and 5,408 observations for 1,060
women.
73This includes 63 observations in which a respondent reported a military occupation
despite not being otherwise identied as in the military.
74These observations were obvious outliers in the distribution of log wage changes. One
of the wage observations in each case was below $0.2. Otherwise, observations that might
appear to be outliers in the distribution of wages were not dropped from the sample.
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The appendix tables A1 and A2 present summary statistics for men and
women that are not presented in Table 1. The mean wage for white men is
pulled up by outliers; however, estimates do not appear sensitive to dropping
these high wage observations. Median hourly wages (not shown) are $9.86
for men and $8.98 for women.
As expected, the sample is largely urban. The dierences in urbanicity
between men and women, as well as most of the dierences in education,
appear to be due to how men and women enter the labor market. Looking
at the entire sample (not shown), instead of focusing on those who are com-
mitted enough to the labor market to be in the estimation sample, reveals no
dierence by gender in urbanicity and much smaller dierences in education.
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
White Men
Wage 19.887 356.121 0.039 23,883.93
Log Wage 2.332 0.619 -3.252 10.081
BMI 26.721 5.524 12.838 63.313
Underweight 0.018 0.134 0 1
Overweight 0.573 0.495 0 1
Obese 0.222 0.415 0 1
Severely Obese 0.078 0.269 0 1
Age 23.711 2.693 16 30
Phone Interview 0.108 0.310 0 1
Yrs since LM Entry 4.474 2.658 1 14
    Yrs in 2009 7.012 2.563 3 14
Actual Experience 4.172 2.459 0.75 13.058
     Exp in 2009 6.398 2.413 1.846 13.058
White Women
Wage 11.051 21.528 0.046 774.08
Log Wage 2.196 0.563 -3.069 6.652
BMI 25.810 6.665 10.962 72.620
Underweight 0.042 0.201 0 1
Overweight 0.417 0.493 0 1
Obese 0.202 0.401 0 1
Severely Obese 0.103 0.304 0 1
Age 23.963 2.554 16 30
Phone Interview 0.103 0.304 0 1
Yrs since LM Entry 4.053 2.491 1 13
    Yrs in 2009 6.187 2.510 3 13
Actual Experience 3.793 2.293 0.75 12.769
     Exp in 2009 5.625 2.334 1.558 12.769
The sample for this table includes all observations that are used as t , t- 1, or t -2 in the main estimation. 
There are 9,037 observations for 1,473 white men; and 5,408 observations for 1060 white women.
Table 1.  Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.ln(wage) 0.0722* 0.0605 0.0648 0.0769* 0.0720* 0.0768*
(0.0414) (0.0410) (0.0416) (0.0420) (0.0412) (0.0421)
Overweight -0.1187 -0.0977 -0.1190
(0.1198) (0.1224) (0.1207)
L.Overweight 0.0540 0.0477 0.0549
(0.0491) (0.0456) (0.0470)
Obese 0.0112 0.0054 -0.0051
(0.0979) (0.1021) (0.1012)
L.Obese 0.0030 0.0175 0.0061
(0.0567) (0.0576) (0.0600)
Severely Obese 0.0465 0.0745 0.0557 0.0360
(0.0927) (0.0938) (0.0925) (0.0951)
L.Severely Obese -0.1699*** -0.1649*** -0.1722*** -0.1668**
(0.0632) (0.0598) (0.0594) (0.0680)
AR(1): z -statistic -5.008 -4.968 -4.995 -5.003 -4.998 -4.994
   p -value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.542 -0.685 -0.693 -0.595 -0.568 -0.603
   p -value 0.588 0.494 0.489 0.552 0.570 0.546
Hansen J Statistic 128.5 144.4 146.3 136.7 130.3 135.3
Hansen test p -value 0.802 0.546 0.501 0.718 0.803 0.707
Diff-in-Hansen Tests for Exogeneity of Subsets of GMM Instruments (p- values)
   ln(wage) lags 0.377 0.367 0.395 0.341 0.347 0.339
   BMI cat. Lags 0.770 0.516 0.533 0.662 0.738 0.678
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . There are 5,897 observations for 1,473 men. All 
specifications have a total of 196 instruments, with lags of all three BMI dummies used as instruments in each case. 
Regressions also control for the local unemployment rate and percent obese in the state, as well as dummies for region, urban 
residence, being interviewed over the phone and its lag, completing HS, some college, and college or beyond, calendar year 
and years since labor market entry. To control for commitment to the labor market I include actual experience and its 
interactions with years since entry; however, I treat experience as endogenous, using potential experience and its interactions 
as instruments.
Results for Traditional BMI Categories
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
Table 2. Effects of Past and Current BMI on the Log Wages of White Men
…
…
…
…
…
…
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.ln(wage) 0.2110*** 0.2308*** 0.2158*** 0.2209*** 0.2237*** 0.2223***
(0.0567) (0.0568) (0.0542) (0.0557) (0.0577) (0.0575)
Overweight 0.0420 0.0760 0.0509 0.0658
(0.1007) (0.0547) (0.0957) (0.0549)
L.Overweight -0.0781 -0.0819** -0.0625 -0.0931**
(0.0519) (0.0402) (0.0466) (0.0436)
Obese 0.0712 0.0937 0.0785
(0.0840) (0.0649) (0.0814)
L.Obese -0.0319 -0.0032 -0.0085
(0.0582) (0.0477) (0.0563)
Severely Obese 0.0166 0.0267 0.0155
(0.0589) (0.0672) (0.0612)
L.Severely Obese -0.0640 -0.0579 -0.0503
(0.0718) (0.0647) (0.0661)
AR(1): z -statistic -4.863 -4.994 -4.937 -4.928 -4.941 -4.907
   p -value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.405 -0.162 -0.329 -0.455 -0.261 -0.405
   p -value 0.686 0.871 0.742 0.649 0.794 0.686
Hansen J Statistic 111.8 114.6 115.2 121.2 113.4 112.2
Hansen test p -value 0.936 0.943 0.938 0.872 0.938 0.947
Diff-in-Hansen Tests for Exogeneity of Subsets of GMM Instruments (p- value)
   ln(wage) lags 0.704 0.667 0.745 0.559 0.775 0.740
   BMI cat. Lags 0.931 0.939 0.912 0.855 0.928 0.958
…
…
…
Results for Traditional BMI Categories
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . There are 3,154 observations for 1,060 women. All 
specifications have a total of 187 instruments, with lags of all three BMI dummies used as instruments in each case. 
Regressions also control for the local unemployment rate and percent obese in the state, as well as dummies for region, urban 
residence, being interviewed over the phone and its lag, completing HS, some college, and college or beyond, calendar year 
and years since labor market entry. To control for commitment to the labor market I include actual experience and its 
interactions with years since entry; however, I treat experience as endogenous, using potential experience and its interactions 
as instruments.
Table 3. Effects of Past and Current BMI on the Log Wages of White Women
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L.ln(wage) 0.2223*** 0.224*** 0.214*** 0.216*** 0.220***
(0.0575) (0.053) (0.059) (0.059) (0.053)
Lower BMI Var. 0.0658 0.084 0.050 -0.003 0.018
(0.0549) (0.071) (0.148) (0.145) (0.085)
L.(Lower BMI Var.) -0.0931** -0.087** -0.112*** -0.123*** -0.104**
(0.0436) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043)
Severely Obese 0.0155 0.008
(0.0612) (0.060)
L.Severely Obese -0.0503 -0.080
(0.0661) (0.065)
BMI ≥ 37 -0.138** -0.131**
(0.058) (0.056)
L.(BMI ≥ 37) -0.069 -0.099*
(0.057) (0.058)
AR(1): z -statistic -4.907 -5.06 -4.91 -4.91 -5.00
   p -value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.405 -0.47 -0.48 -0.63 -0.62
   p -value 0.686 0.637 0.634 0.528 0.534
Hansen J  statistic 112.2 101.27 120.3 117.9 105.3
Hansen test p -value 0.947 0.989 0.885 0.891 0.976
Diff-in-Hansen Tests for Exogeneity of Subsets of GMM Instruments (p- values)
   ln(wage) lags 0.740 0.749 0.590 0.53 0.472
   BMI cat. Lags 0.958 0.993 0.856 0.888 0.983
Lower BMI Variable: BMI ≥ 24.5
…
…
Lower BMI Variable: Overweight
Table 4. Effects of Past and Current BMI on the Log Wages of White Women
Results for Alternative BMI Categories
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . There are 3,154 observations for 1,060 women. All specifications 
use lags of three BMI dummy variables as GMM instruments. (See text for further detail.) There are 187 instruments in columns (1), (3) and 
(4); and 185 in (2) and (5) where BMI ≥ 37 is used. See Table 3 for a description of control variables.
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
Preferred Dynamic Dynamic w/ OLS OLS
Specification BMI exogenous W/out Lags W/ Lags
L.ln(wage) 0.0720* 0.1213***
(0.0412) (0.0470)
Overweight -0.1190 0.0305 0.0655*** 0.0387
(0.1207) (0.0317) (0.0166) (0.0271)
L.overwt 0.0549 0.0115 0.0371
(0.0470) (0.0312) (0.0269)
Severely Obese 0.0557 0.0314 -0.0652** -0.0113
(0.0925) (0.0382) (0.0266) (0.0495)
L.(Severely Obese) -0.1722*** -0.0525 -0.0813
(0.0594) (0.0609) (0.0517)
AR(1): z -statistic -4.998 -4.746 10.57 10.59
   p- value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.568 -0.523 11.95 11.90
   p -value 0.570 0.601 < 0.001 < 0.001
Number of Instruments 196 88 … …
Hansen test (p- value) 0.803 0.766 … …
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .  There are 5,897 observations for 1,473 men.  Specifications 
are as described in previous tables, except for BMI variables being treated as exogenous in the second column and the OLS 
regressions using potential experience in place of actual, as described in the text.
…
Table 5A.  Preferred Specification Compared to Simpler Models
White Men
… …
…
Preferred Dynamic Dynamic w/ OLS OLS
Specification BMI exogenous W/out Lags W/ Lags
WHO BMI Thresholds
L.ln(wage) 0.2223*** 0.2986***
(0.0575) (0.0746)
Overweight 0.0658 -0.0168 -0.0579*** -0.0074
(0.0549) (0.0342) (0.0211) (0.0289)
L.overwt -0.0931** 0.0151 -0.0694**
(0.0436) (0.0297) (0.0291)
Severely Obese 0.0155 -0.0096 0.0119 0.0136
(0.0612) (0.0569) (0.0290) (0.0355)
L.(Severely Obese) -0.0503 -0.0234 0.0126
(0.0661) (0.0391) (0.0368)
AR(1): z -statistic -4.907 -4.891 10.48 10.53
   p- value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.405 -0.536 7.756 7.768
   p -value 0.686 0.592 < 0.001 < 0.001
Number of Instruments 187 86 … …
Hansen test (p- value) 0.947 0.818 … …
Alternative BMI Thresholds
L.ln(wage) 0.2197*** 0.3009***
(0.0528) (0.0730)
BMI ≥ 24.5 0.0177 0.0084 -0.0602*** 0.0069
(0.0852) (0.0277) (0.0207) (0.0303)
L.(BMI ≥ 24.5) -0.1039** 0.0195 -0.0904***
(0.0431) (0.0332) (0.0302)
BMI ≥ 37 -0.1305** 0.0615 0.0269 -0.0005
(0.0564) (0.0771) (0.0321) (0.0401)
L.(BMI ≥ 37) -0.0990* -0.0099 0.0535
(0.0577) (0.0825) (0.0412)
AR(1): z -statistic -5.028 -4.904 10.48 10.54
   p- value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.606 -0.604 7.761 7.773
   p -value 0.545 0.546 < 0.001 < 0.001
Number of Instruments 187 86 … …
Hansen test (p- value) 0.976 0.818 … …
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .  There are 3,154 observations for 1,060 women.  
Specifications are as described in previous tables, except for BMI variables being treated as exogenous in the second column and the 
OLS regressions using potential experience in place of actual, as described in the text.
Table 5B.  Preferred Specification Compared to Simpler Models
White Women
… …
…
…
… …
…
…
Preferred Occupation Preferred Occupation Preferred Occupation
Specification Added Specification Added Specification Added
L.ln(wage) 0.0720* 0.0721* 0.2223*** 0.2009*** 0.2197*** 0.2170***
(0.0412) (0.0411) (0.0575) (0.0529) (0.0528) (0.0473)
Overweight -0.1190 -0.0850 0.0658 0.0488
(0.1207) (0.1126) (0.0549) (0.0852)
L.Overweight 0.0549 0.0510 -0.0931** -0.0604
(0.0470) (0.0463) (0.0436) (0.0436)
Severely Obese 0.0557 0.0652 0.0155 0.0107
(0.0925) (0.1137) (0.0612) (0.0547)
L.(Severely Obese) -0.1722*** -0.2138*** -0.0503 -0.0622
(0.0594) (0.0790) (0.0661) (0.0564)
BMI ≥ 24.5 0.0177 0.0081
(0.0852) (0.0870)
L.(BMI ≥ 24.5) -0.1039** -0.0783*
(0.0431) (0.0455)
BMI ≥ 37 -0.1305** -0.0806
(0.0564) (0.0520)
L.(BMI ≥ 37) -0.0990* -0.0553
(0.0577) (0.0540)
Difference-in-Hansen Tests for Added Occupation Instruments
   p -values … 0.430 0.152 … 0.261
Table 6.  Effects of Adding Occupation to the Preferred Model
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  There are 5,897 observations for 1,473 men, and 3,154 
observations for 1,060 women. Occupations are grouped into five categories with service occupations being the comparison group. 
Second lagged levels of occupation dummies are used as instruments, producing a total of 200 instruments for men and 189 for 
women. 
… …
… …
… …
… …
White WomenWhite Men White Women
… …
… …
… …
… …
…
… …
…
… …
… …
Table 7. Effects of Health Shocks on Identification in the Preferred Models
Preferred Preferred
Specification  t  only t & t -1 Specification  t  only t & t -1
WHO BMI Thresholds
L.ln(wage) 0.0720* 0.0709* 0.0707* 0.2223*** 0.2255*** 0.2235***
(0.0412) (0.0416) (0.0414) (0.0575) (0.0569) (0.0568)
Overweight -0.1190 -0.1266 -0.1239 0.0658 0.0783 0.0954
(0.1207) (0.1148) (0.1168) (0.0549) (0.0801) (0.0898)
L.Overweight 0.0549 0.0569 0.0561 -0.0931** -0.0881** -0.0845*
(0.0470) (0.0477) (0.0476) (0.0436) (0.0429) (0.0459)
Severely Obese 0.0557 0.0311 0.0310 0.0155 0.0256 0.0094
(0.0925) (0.0991) (0.1027) (0.0612) (0.0683) (0.0700)
L.(Severely Obese) -0.1722*** -0.1708*** -0.1697*** -0.0503 -0.0605 -0.0667
(0.0594) (0.0645) (0.0643) (0.0661) (0.0671) (0.0673)
Hansen J statistic, χ2(df) 130.3 129.2 129.6 112.2 114.6 113.9
   p -value 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.95 0.93 0.93
BMI diff-in-Hansen, χ2(df 102.1 101.2 101.6 81.31 83.55 82.66
   p -value 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.96 0.94 0.95
Alternative BMI Thresholds for White Women
L.ln(wage) 0.2197*** 0.2191*** 0.2285***
(0.0528) (0.0541) (0.0535)
BMI ≥ 24.5 0.0177 0.0218 0.0190
(0.0852) (0.1087) (0.1021)
L.(BMI ≥ 24.5) -0.1039** -0.0993** -0.0950**
(0.0431) (0.0423) (0.0456)
BMI ≥ 37 -0.1305** -0.1405** -0.1499**
(0.0564) (0.0576) (0.0619)
L.(BMI ≥ 37) -0.0990* -0.1084* -0.1005*
(0.0577) (0.0554) (0.0564)
Hansen J statistic, χ2(df) 105.3 106.8 108.7
   p -value 0.98 0.97 0.96
BMI diff-in-Hansen, χ2(df 75.1 76.1 77.6
   p -value 0.98 0.98 0.97
White Men White Women
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  There are 5,897 observations for 1,473 men, and 3,154 
observations for 1,060 women. General Health is reported on a 5-point scale from "Excellent" (1) to "Poor" (5), with "Excellent" being the 
excluded category. χ2 degrees of freedom for the Hansen J  statistic and BMI diff-in-Hansen are 145 and 112 for men, and 136 and 103 
for women.
…
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Changes in Health Changes in Health
… … …
……
… … …
… … …
… … …
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(Wage) 2.332 0.619 -3.252 10.081
ln(Wage) Difference 0.052 0.587 -6.202 6.142
Decrease in BMI cat. 0.031 0.174 0 1
Increase in BMI cat. 0.058 0.235 0 1
South 0.319 0.466 0 1
Urban 0.703 0.457 0 1
Part Time 0.071 0.257 0 1
Married 0.231 0.422 0 1
Any Children 0.272 0.445 0 1
HS 0.362 0.480 0 1
Some College 0.239 0.427 0 1
College 0.171 0.376 0 1
Local Unempl. Rate 6.314 2.734 0 27.8
Occupations
Service 0.155 0.362 0 1
Mgmt, Tech., & Prof. 0.177 0.382 0 1
Sales 0.109 0.312 0 1
Clerical, Admin. 0.088 0.284 0 1
Misc. Blue Collar 0.470 0.499 0 1
Note: As in Table 1, there are 9,037 observations used for most of these variables. Occuption summarized
where not missing. "Decrease (or Increase) in BMI cat." refers to the fraction who move to a lower (or higher)
BMI category as defined by the WHO.
Table A1.  Additional Summary Statistics for White Men
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(Wage) 2.196 0.563 -3.069 6.652
ln(Wage) Difference 0.044 0.488 -6.060 4.499
Decrease in BMI cat. 0.026 0.159 0 1
Increase in BMI cat. 0.051 0.220 0 1
South 0.331 0.470 0 1
Urban 0.757 0.429 0 1
Part Time 0.115 0.319 0 1
Married 0.253 0.435 0 1
Any Children 0.204 0.403 0 1
HS 0.280 0.449 0 1
Some College 0.282 0.450 0 1
College 0.319 0.466 0 1
Local Unempl. Rate 6.237 2.674 0 19.2
Occupations
Service 0.236 0.425 0 1
Mgmt, Tech., & Prof. 0.314 0.464 0 1
Sales 0.133 0.340 0 1
Clerical, Admin. 0.248 0.432 0 1
Misc. Blue Collar 0.069 0.254 0 1
Note: As in Table 1, there are 5,408 observations used for most of these variables. Occuption summarized
where not missing. "Decrease (or Increase) in BMI cat." refers to the fraction who move to a lower (or higher)
BMI category as defined by the WHO.
Table A2.  Additional Summary Statistics for White Women
